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Abstract 
  
 This paper provides an exhaustive assessment of feasible horizons for policy 
harmonization against African capital flight. The empirical evidence is based on a 
methodological innovation on common policy initiatives and the results are premised on 15 
fundamental characteristics of African capital flight based on income-levels, legal origins, 
natural resources, political stability and religious domination. Based on the findings, a 
genuine standard-setting timeframe is in the horizon of 6-13 years. Within the timeframe, 
common policies are feasible and could be enforced without distinction of nationality or 
locality in identified fundamental characteristics with full convergence.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 The status of Africa as a net creditor to the rest of the world is certainly one of the 
most heartbreaking and earthshaking paradoxes in contemporary development economics. 
The continent is facing substantial challenges in terms of: among others, hindering public 
investment, growing financing gaps and poor social delivery. Accordingly, a crucial 
constraint to African development is the lack of financing (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012).  But 
paradoxically, it is the source of exponential capital flight that has considerably escalated over 
the last decade. Borrowing from Boyce & Ndikumana, 33 sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries lost a total of 814 billion (constant 2010 US$) from 1970 to 2010. This far surpasses 
the amount of official development aid ($659 billion) and foreign direct investment ($306 
billion) received by these countries. Put at best, this amount of capital flight stood at $ 1.06 
trillion in 2010, ultimately outweighing the $189 billion of external liabilities in that same 
year if the United State Treasury Bill rate was to be applied.  
 In light of the above, this paper provides an African picture on feasible timelines for 
policy harmonization against capital flight based on recent methodological innovations on the 
adoption of common policies (Asongu, 2012a). The empirical evidence is based on 37 
countries and the richness of our dataset provides us with the degrees of freedom necessary to 
disaggregate countries into fundamental characteristics of capital flight based on income-
levels, legal origins, natural resources, political stability and religious domination. The 
intuition motivating the study is that, upholding blanket policies in the battle against capital 
flight may not be effective unless they are contingent on the fundamental characteristics and 
prevailing trajectories, dynamics and tendencies of capital flight within identified fundamental 
characteristics. The theoretical and empirical underpinnings on which the study is built are 
twofold: convergence in capital flight within a fundamental characteristic will mean the 
adoption of common policies is feasible and; full convergence  implies the enforcement of the 
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common policies without distinction of nationality or locality within each fundamental 
characteristic (Asongu, 2012a).  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Data and methodology are discussed and 
outlined respectively in Section 2. The empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1 Data 
 
We investigate a sample of 37 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the 
World Bank (WB) for the period 1980-2010. The analysis is limited to only 37 African 
countries because the data on capital flight from Boyce & Ndikumana (2012) is only available 
for these countries. Fundamental characteristics
1
 of petroleum-exporting and conflict-affected 
countries are consistent with Weeks (2012). To these we add, legal origins (La Porta et al., 
1998; Asongu, 2012b), income-levels (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003; Narayan et al., 2011; 
Asongu, 2012c) and religious dominations (Asongu, 2012d) consistent with recent 
convergence literature. The choice of the control variables is in line with theoretical 
underpinnings of conditional convergence which state that, if countries differ in 
macroeconomic and institutional characteristics on which capital flight is endogenous then, it 
is possible for conditional convergence to take place. The eight control variables employed 
include: per capita economic prosperity, public investment, trade, private capital flows, rule of 
law, financial development, inflation and foreign aid
2
. From the summary statistics it could be 
noticed that, there is quite a degree of variation in the data utilized so that one should be 
comfortable and confident that reasonable estimated relationships would emerge. An initial 
                                                 
1
 Government quality (transparency, corruption, regulation quality …etc) and macroeconomic fundamental 
characteristics have the limitation of being time-dynamic. 
2
 Please see Appendix 1 for definitions and sources of the variables.  
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correlation analysis which has served to mitigate issues of overparametization and 
multicolinearity shows that, there are no issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated
3
.  
We devote space to laying emphasize on the comparability and compatibility 
dimensions of the capital flight measurement. This capital flight indicator has two main 
drawbacks: it is neither compatible with the underpinnings of the convergence theory nor 
comparable with other variables. The capital flight indicator in the Boyce & Ndikumana 
(2012) database is in constant $ 2010 million terms. Hence, it is neither compatible with 
GDP-based underpinnings of the convergence literature nor comparable with other control 
variables. To tackle the two issues, we:  first convert current GDP to constant 2010 terms; 
then we divide the corresponding values by 1 000 000 to obtain a ‘GDP constant of 2010 
USD (in millions) and; finally we divide the capital flight data by the ‘GDP constant of 2010 
USD (in millions). Hence, we have a capital measurement that is in GDP ratio (see Appendix 
1).   
 
2.2 Methodology  
 
The estimation procedure is typically in line with evidence from recent convergence 
literature (Asongu, 2012a). The choice of the β-convergence modeling strategy is due to 
constraints in the data set; which is panel. The dynamic panel system GMM estimation 
technique employed is as follows: 
titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln(                                                (1)
 
tititititi WYY ,,,, )ln()ln(    
                                                            (2) 
 
)()()ln()ln()ln( ,,2,,2,,,,     titititititititi WWYYYY
                 (3) 
 
                                                 
3
 Owing space constraints, the correlation analysis and summary statistics have not been presented but can be 
provided upon request.  
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 where tiY ,  is the proxy for capital flight in country i at period t. σ = 1+ β. tiW ,  is a vector of 
determinants of capital flight (or control variables),  i  is a country-specific effect,  t  is a 
time-specific constant and,  ti ,  an error term. Absolute convergence is estimated in the 
absence of tiW , .  Consistent with Islam (1995, p. 14),  yearly time spans are too short to be 
appropriate for studying convergence, as short-run disturbances may loom substantially in 
such brief time spans. Therefore, considering the data span of 31 years, we are consistent with 
Asongu (2012a) in using two-year non-overlapping intervals (NOI).  This means in the 
analysis, τ is set to 2. We also analyze the implied rate of convergence by computing σ/2. 
Accordingly, the estimated coefficient of the lagged differenced endogenous variable is 
divided by 2 because we have used a two year interval to absorb the short-term disturbances. 
With 10   , we conclude the presence of convergence. The broader interpretation 
suggests, past differences have less proportionate impact on future variations, implying the 
variation on the left hand side of Eq. (3) is decreasing overtime (Asongu, 2012a). 
 
3. Empirical results  
 
 Table 1 presents results that answer three questions motivating paper. In other words, 
policy makers are most likely to ask the following three questions before considering the 
harmonization of policies on capital flight. (1) Is capital flight converging within Africa or 
not? (2) If so, what is the rate and timing of the convergence process? (3) For which identified 
fundamental characteristics (of capital flight) do answers to the first and second questions 
apply? While an answer to the first question will guide on the feasibility of harmonizing 
blanket policies, the answer to the second will guide on an optimal timeline for such blanket 
policies.  Accordingly, the answer to the third (given that the first-two are already answered), 
will determine the feasibility-of, timeframe-for and exclusiveness (or non arbitrariness) of the 
common policies. This third question is most relevant because, it underscores the imperative 
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for common policies to be contingent on the prevailing speeds of and time for full (100%) 
convergence within each identified fundamental characteristic of capital flight. The results 
broadly show that, a feasible horizon for the harmonization of blanket policies is between 6 to 
13 years.  
 
Table 1: Timelines for policy harmonization against capital flight   
        
  Absolute Convergence (AC) Conditional Convergence(CC) 
  AC % of AC Yrs to AC CC % of CC Yrs to CC 
 
Income 
Levels 
Upper Middle Income Yes 2% 100Yrs Yes 16.60% 12Yrs 
Lower  Middle Income  No --- --- No --- --- 
Middle Income  Yes 2% 100Yrs No --- --- 
Low Income  Yes 33.10% 6.04Yrs Yes 20.05% 9.97Yrs 
        
Legal 
Origins  
English Common Law  Yes 33.05% 6.05Yrs No --- --- 
French Civil Law  Yes 12.50% 16Yrs Yes 16.40% 12.1Yrs 
        
Religion  Christianity  Yes 33.00% 6.05Yrs Yes 16.40% 12.1Yrs 
Islam  No --- --- No --- --- 
        
Regions  Sub-Saharan Africa  Yes 33.05% 6.05Yrs Yes 16.55% 12Yrs 
North Africa  Yes 17.70% 11.2Yrs No --- --- 
        
Resources Oil Exporting  Yes 15.50% 12.8Yrs Yes 15.65% 12.7Yrs 
Non Oil Exporting  Yes 33.05% 6.05Yrs No --- --- 
        
Stability  Conflict  Yes 33.11% 6.04Yrs Yes 29.75% 6.72Yrs 
Non-conflict  No --- --- Yes 16.88% 11.8Yrs 
        
Africa  Yes 33.05% 6.05Yrs Yes 16.50% 12.1Yrs 
       
        
Yrs: Years.  
 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
This paper has provided an exhaustive assessment of feasible horizons for policy 
harmonization against African capital flight. The empirical evidence is based on a 
methodological innovation on common policy initiatives and the results are premised on 15 
fundamental characteristics of African capital flight based on income-levels, legal origins, 
natural resources, political stability and religious domination. Based on the findings, a 
genuine standard-setting timeframe is in the horizon of 6-13 years. Within the timeframe, 
common policies are feasible and could be enforced without distinction of nationality or 
locality in identified fundamental characteristics with full convergence. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions(Measurement) Sources 
    
Public Investment  Pub. Ivt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Private Capital  Flows  PCF  Private Capital Flows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Openness  Trade  Imports plus Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law (estimate): Captures perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence.  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
GDP per capita Growth  GDPpcg Average annual GDP per capita growth rate  World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Foreign Aid  DAC Aid NODA from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Liquid Liabilities  LL Financial System Deposits (% of GDP) World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Inflation  Inflation  Consumer Price Index (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Capital Flight  Cap. Flight  Capital Flight (constant of  2010 in % of GDP) Boyce & 
Ndikumana (2012)  
    
FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  NODA: Net Official Development 
Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
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